Western Washington University

Western CEDAR
Liberal Studies

Humanities

2-2012

Mythology, Madness and Laughter: Subjectivity in
German Idealism – Book Review
Andrea Gogrof
Western Washington University, andrea.gogrof@wwu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/liberalstudies_facpubs
Part of the Liberal Studies Commons
Recommended Citation
Gogrof, Andrea, "Mythology, Madness and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism – Book Review" (2012). Liberal Studies. 2.
https://cedar.wwu.edu/liberalstudies_facpubs/2

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Humanities at Western CEDAR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Liberal
Studies by an authorized administrator of Western CEDAR. For more information, please contact westerncedar@wwu.edu.

0\WKRORJ\0DGQHVVDQG/DXJKWHU6XEMHFWLYLW\LQ*HUPDQ
,GHDOLVP UHYLHZ
Andrea Gogröf-Voorhees

German Studies Review, Volume 35, Number 1, February 2012, pp.
155-156 (Article)
3XEOLVKHGE\7KH-RKQV+RSNLQV8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV
DOI: 10.1353/gsr.2012.0055

For additional information about this article
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/gsr/summary/v035/35.1.gogrof-voorhees.html

Access provided by your local institution (31 Oct 2014 14:49 GMT)

Reviews
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The study’s intent is not so much to offer or defend a proposition, but rather
to provide a discussion and analysis; it is in that sense very much a dissertation as
opposed to a thesis. The research is broad, the content informative, and the writing quite engaging. While Dr. Dutchman-Smith does not directly approach the big
question as to what Hoffmann’s tales are all about, she does wish to portray him as a
thinker, an author concerned with ideas. Thus she writes in her conclusion, “I have
demonstrated that alcoholic themes, structures, and symbols were used by Hoffmann
in his literary works to express many different ideas, touching on many different areas
of concern, be they artistic, political, medical and/or moral” (170). She also seems
clearly to adhere to the view, especially prevalent among critics influenced by the
neo-Romanticism of the turn to the twentieth century in its making a religion of art,
that Hoffmann is largely concerned with depicting what came to be called the problem
of the artist or the development of artistic sensibility. She comments, for example,
regarding Der goldne Topf (107), “I do however wish to show that Anselmus’s use of
and attitude toward alcohol features early on in the tale, and his changing relationship
with drink plays an important role in locating him at particular stages in his artistic
development.”
In sum, Dutchman-Smith has produced the most interesting and informative
discussion of Hoffmann’s relationship to drink and the use made of that relationship
by him in his literary works and by his critics in judging him, all in the context of
attitudes toward the use of alcohol in their respective times.
James M. McGlathery, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Mythology, Madness and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism. By Markus
Gabriel and Slavoj Žižek. London: Continuum, 2009. Pp. 202. Cloth $24.95. ISBN
978-1441191052.
The fetching title of this book is misleading. Those who are interested in learning
about mythology, laughter, and madness as constitutive concepts defining German
Idealism are in for a challenging surprise. This book, divided into three parts (part
one by Markus Gabriel, parts two and three by Slavoj Žižek), with each part divided
into essays of unequal length, is for specialists of German Idealism exclusively.
Academics with background knowledge only will gain, perhaps, some small insights
of value concerning the debate between the (post)modern ontological argument
and the one supporting traditional epistemology. The main argument, however, gets
lost through Gabriel and Žižek’s conceptual virtuosity. Here is just one example:
“The weird sounding syntagm ‘coefficient of adversity’ belongs to G. Bachelard who
reproached Husserl’s phenomenology with ignoring the inertia of objects resisting
subjective appropriation in its notion of noematic objectivity as constituted by the
transcendental subject’s noetic activity” (Žižek 156).
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However, the leading idea of the book is sensible. The authors posit Kant’s
“critique of all possible metaphysics” (1) once more as the cornerstone of modern
philosophy, to show how post-Kantian Idealism still represents the most sophisticated
and, ironically enough, realistic way to think of philosophy and subjective consciousness and personal agency today. Countering the conservative school of analytical
philosophy (i.e., Moore and Russell) that defends Kant as the last philosopher “who
makes sense” against the “undisciplined regressions into meaningless speculation”
performed by the main representatives of the post-Kantian turn, namely Schelling,
Hegel, and Fichte, and weary of the “continental,” post-Hegelian deconstructionist,
poststructuralist, and neopragmatist philosophers who see the post-Kantian turn as
the central, yet untranslatable philosophical event always already on its way and yet
to be deciphered, Gabriel and Žižek propose to tackle what they see as having so far
been neglected by these two camps (the nature of the absolute and the concept of
finitude) and to offer new and original perspectives on the problem of subjectivity in
German Idealism. Simply put, their argument advances, and their examples illustrate,
that contemporary philosophy, analytical and continental, fails to recognize that
the works of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel contain in themselves and thus already
anticipate the “alleged” post-Hegelian turn defined by the suspicion of any form of
dialectical mediation as a process of world-, truth-, and self-formation. Neither Gabriel
nor Žižek promote a return to (neo-) Hegelianism as a justification of the “necessity
of contingency” (Gabriel 52). However, both debunk contemporary tendencies in
modern philosophy, politics, and culture to naively or conveniently embrace indeterminacy and ethical relativism to the detriment of (all-too-often traumatic) concrete
historical reality and personal accountability. Gabriel, in his defense of what I would
call conscious mythology, defends self-reflexivity, the actualized, concrete paradox of
subjective consciousness as the fundamental and positive, creative and “real” activity,
in a welcome moment of clarity: “The world creates images of itself in the activity of
our creation of images of the world.” This does not elevate the world to the realm of
theory, but posits it as a (present and finite) creation out of our own doing in the here
and now: “Our world pictures are not cheap copies of what there really is because
they are an essential aspect of what there really is” (Gabriel 35).
Similarly, Žižek’s insightful reevaluation of the Hegelian concept of “habit” as the
saving “grace” from madness and his analysis of the Fichtean laughter as the expression of the Lacanian marker of humanness, “terrifying excess” as in the infamous
“objet a,” shows his justified plea for an honest acknowledgement of (repressed)
human self-limitation as the thing to be tackled anew and perhaps radicalized.
Andrea Gogröf-Voorhees, Western Washington University

